Abstrucf-In 1984, Shamir introduced the concept of an identity-based cryptosystem. In this system, each user needs to visit a key authentication center (KAC) and identify himself before joining a communication network. Once a user is accepted, the KAC will provide him with a secret key. In this way, if a user wants to communicate with others, he only needs to know the "identity" of his communication partner and the public key of the KAC. There is no public file required in this system. However, Shamir did not succeed in constructing an identitybased cryptosystem, but only in constructing an identity-based signature scheme. In this paper, we propose three identity-based cryptographic schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem: the user identification scheme, the digital signature scheme, and the key distribution scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
N a network environment, a secret session key needs I to be shared between two users to establish a secret communication. While the number of users in the network is increasing, key distribution will become a serious problem. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [l] introduced the concept of the public key distribution system (PKDS). In the PKDS, each user needs to select a secret key and compute a corresponding public key stored in the public directory. The common secret session key, which will be shared between two users, can then be determined by either user, based on his own secret key and the partner's public key. Although the PKDS provides an elegant way to solve the key distribution problem, the major concern is the authentication of the public keys used in the cryptographic algorithm.
Many attempts have been made to deal with the public key authentication issue. Kohnfelder [2] used the RSA digital signature scheme to provide public key certification. His system involves two kinds of public key cryptography: one is in modular p, where p is a large prime number; the other is in modular n, where n = pq, and p and q are large primes. Blom [3] proposed a symmetric key generation system (SKGS) based on secret sharing schemes. The problems of SKGS, however, are the difficulty of choosing a suitable threshold value and the requirement of large memory space for storing the secret shadow of each user.
In 1984, Shamir [4] introduced the concept of an identitybased cryptosystem. In this system, each user needs to visit a key authentication center (KAC) and identify himself before joining the network. Once a user is accepted, the KAC will provide him with a secret key. In this way, a user needs only to know the "identity" of his communication partner and the public key of the KAC, together with his secret key, to communicate with others. There is no public file required in this system. However, Shamir did not succeed in constructing an identity-based cryptosystem, but only in constructing an identity-based signature scheme. Since then, much research has been devoted, especially in Japan, to various kinds of ID-based cryptographic schemes. Okamoto et al. [5] proposed an identity-based key distribution system in 1988, and later, Ohta [6] extended their scheme for user identification. These schemes use the RSA public key cryptosystem [7] for operations in modular n , where n is a product of two large primes, and the security of these schemes is based on the computational difficulty of factoring this large composite number n. Tsujii and Itoh [8] have also proposed an IDbased cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem. Most recently, Tsujii and Chao [9] proposed a noninteractive ID-based key sharing system.
In this paper, we propose three identity-based cryptographic schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem in GF(p), where p is a large prime. Our schemes can provide user identification, digital signature, and key distribution. Since our schemes are based on the Agnew et al. digital signature scheme [lo], we will first review their scheme in the next section. User identification scheme, digital signature scheme, and key distribution scheme will be discussed in Sections 111, IV, and V, respectively.
REVIEW OF THE AGNEW et d. DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME
We now review a digital signature scheme proposed by Agnew et al. [lo] in 1990. This scheme was due to ElGamal's signature scheme [ 1 11 based on the discrete logarithm problem.
We start with a large prime p and a primitive element a of GF(p), which are all known to the public. In order to provide adequate security, Pohlig and Hellman [12] indicate that p should be selected such that p -1 contains at least one large prime factor. They recommend choosing p = 2p' + 1, where p' is a large prime too. A one-way function f also needs to be made public.
In . We use a challenge-response-type interactive protocol here. The procedure can be described as follows.
Step I : User i sends (ID*, T;) to the verifier.
Step 2: The verifier randomly selects an odd number W is sent back to user i.
signature of message m as am' = T~~L modp, wherem' = f(m).
Step 3: User i computes Z = Ws* modp
IDENTITY-BASED USER IDENTEICATION SCHEME
Gunther and Boveri [13] proposed a user identification scheme based on ElGamal's signature scheme. However, in order to authenticate a user, additional zero-knowledge proof protocols, such as the Chaum, Evertse, and van de Graaf protocol [14] , are required. In our scheme, user identification can be achieved directly through a challenge-response-type procedure.
Generally, an identity-based cryptosystem consists of three phases: the initiation phase, user registration phase, and application phase. The first two phases are applicable to all different applications. Since the digital signature and key distribution schemes are derived from the user identification scheme, we present the user identification scheme first. The procedure to identify user i can be described as follows.
Initiation Phase: The key authentication center (KAC) selects a one-way function f, a large prime p , and a primitive element a of GF(p), which are all known to the public. p should be selected such that p = 2p' + 1, where p' is also a large prime. A random number z E [ l , p -11, with gcd(x,p -1) = 1, is selected as KAC's private key which is used to compute KAC's public key, Y = a" mod p. We note that due to the property of gcd(x,p -1) = 1, the public key Y is also a primitive element of GF(p). Step 4: The verifier uses 2 and the extended user identity -1 aEIDz = T T ' Z~ modp.
If the above equation holds, user i is then identified.
Security: In order to analyze the security of the above scheme, we propose five possible attacks here. As we can see, none of them can break our scheme.
Attack 1: Any intruder knows 2, W, p , and 2 = Wsa mod p. Trying to solve s; from this information is always equivalent to computing the discrete logarithm over GF(p). Thus, user 2's secret key s; will never be revealed to the public. (yEID* = r;:ys: modp. This is an extremely difficult problem and, in all likelihood, is more difficult than the discrete logarithm problem itself [lo] . where T; = akt mod p and ki is randomly selected from [ l , p -11. We note here that due to ElGamal's attack 5 [ll] , which allows an intruder to use a known legitimate signature IV. IDENTITY-BASED DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME
Suppose
In the following, we present two key distribution schemes. The first one only provides indirect key authentication, and the the same. The second one provides direct key authentication, and the common secret key is different from one time to the wants to sign a message M. Without losing generality, we assume the user's Secret key si obtained from common secret session shared between two users is KAC is an odd number (i.e., g c d ( s i , p -1) = 1).
Digital Signature Generating Procedure
The digital signature generating procedure can be described as follows.
Step 1 : Find the one-way result, M' = f (M, Time), where f is the public known one-way function, Time is used as a time-stamp, and M is a message to be signed.
Step 2: User i randomly selects a number (T; from [O, p -1 1 and computes 6; = Yuz modp.
Step 3: Given this key as public-known information, it is still computationally infeasible to derive s,. On the other hand, user z can use his secret key s, to sign messages repeatedly. The security discussion of our scheme is the same as the Agnew et al. signature scheme.
V. IDENTITY-BASED KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
Gunther and Boveri [13] also show an identity-based keyexchange protocol based on the ElGamal signature scheme. In their protocol, however, the communication key can only be authenticated indirectly. In other words, the protocol does not provide any authentication for the exchanged keys, although unauthorized users cannot share the same session key with a registered user.
next.
Key Distribution with Indirect Authentication
Suppose users i and j want to share a common secret session key Ki,j. User i sends (ID;, r; Since Ki,j = Kj,;, this is the exact common secret session key shared between users z and j . This scheme authenticates the session keys indirectly, because actual authentication is achieved only when the decrypted message sent by the other party is meaningful during communication. However, an intruder cannot impersonate any authorized user to share a common session key with any other authorized user. This is because our method is an identity-based key distribution scheme, and the common secret session key involves two individual secret keys known only to these two users with correct identities.
Key Distribution with Direct Authentication
Here we present an ID-based key exchange protocol which allows two users not only to share a common secret session key, but also to authenticate the exchanged public keys.
Step 1: User i randomly selects a number vi E [ l , p -11, then computes W; = Y U a modp.
By using the signature scheme described in the previous section, user i generates the signature pair (Wi, vi) 
VI. CONCLUSION
Three identity-based cryptographic schemes have been discussed in this paper. These schemes use the operations in modular p : where p is a large prime. User identification and the digital signature scheme can be used to authenticate the user and message itself without revealing any secret information. The key distribution scheme can be used to establish any secret communication between any two users.
